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Sebastian Schmidt, Dr.
Contact: sebastian.schmidt@philos.uzh.ch

Research

 

Area of specialisation

  • Epistemology

  • (Meta)ethics

 

Area of competence

  • Philosophy of Mind

  • Metaphilosophy

  • Moral Psychology

  • Animal Minds and Animal Ethics

  • Later Wittgenstein

  • Ancient Philosophy

Curriculum vitae

09/2022-08/2023

SNSF Postdoc Mobility Fellow

Project: "Towards a Relationship-Based Epistemology" (Link)

University of Southern California (mentored by Ralph Wedgwood) and University of Glasgow (mentored by Mona Simion)

09/2021– present

Research Associate

African Center for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (ACEPS), led by Veli Mitova, University of Johannesburg (Link)

Visits: 02-03/2022; prospective visit in 2023

12/2020 – present

Postdoctoral Researcher (Link)

University of Zurich

10/2015 – 11/2020

Ph.D. in Philosophy

FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg

Dissertation: The Problem of Mental Responsibility (Link)

Funded by German Academic Foundation (Studienstiftung)

04/2019 – 11/2020

Assistant (Wissenschaftlicher Assistent/Mitarbeiter)

University of Zurich, FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg

2015 – 2019

Visiting Graduate Student

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), City University of New York (CUNY), University of Reading

04/2011 – 09/2015

M.A. in Philosophy, B.A. in Philosophy and German Studies

FAU-Erlangen-Nuremberg

Selected publications

A) Monograph

Responsibility for Rationality. Foundations of an Ethics of Mind

New York: Routledge (forthcoming)

Under contract for Routledge Studies in Epistemology series.

B) Edited Volumes and Special Issues

Beyond Evidence in Epistemology.

forthcoming Special Issue of Philosophical Topics

with Anne Meylan, Melanie Sarzano, and Marie van Loon

Altruismus. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven

Berlin: J.B. Metzler (forthcoming)

with Dagmar Kiesel and Thomas Smettan

The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity

New York: Routledge 2020 (Routledge Studies in Epistemology series)

with Gerhard Ernst

B) Journal Articles

On Believing Indirectly for Practical Reasons

Philosophical Studies 179 (2022), 1795-1819.

Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1-17. Online first.

Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence

Erkenntnis, 1-24. Online first.

Rationality and Responsibility

Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (2020), 379-385.

Why We Should Promote Irrationality

Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (2017), 605-615.

 

Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens

Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2016), 571-582.