Dr. Sebastian Schmidt
Research
Area of specialisation
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Epistemology
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(Meta)ethics
Area of competence
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Philosophy of Mind
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Metaphilosophy
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Moral Psychology
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Animal Minds and Animal Ethics
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Later Wittgenstein
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Ancient Philosophy
Curriculum vitae
09/2021– present
Research Associate
African Center for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (ACEPS), University of Johannesburg
12/2020 – present
Postdoctoral Researcher
University of Zurich
02/2022 – 03/2022
Visiting Research
African Center for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (ACEPS), University of Johannesburg, mentored by V. Mitova
10/2015 – 11/2020
Ph.D. in Philosophy
FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg
Title of Dissertation: The Problem of Mental Responsibility. Outlines of an Ethics of Mind
10/2019 – 11/2020
Assistant
University of Zurich
04/2019 – 07/2019
Assistant (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter)
FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg
2015 – 2019
Visiting Graduate Student
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), mentored by P. Hieronymi
City University of New York (CUNY), mentored by D. Papineau
University of Reading, mentored by D. Owens.
10/2013 – 09/2015
M.A. in Philosophy
FAU-Erlangen-Nuremberg
04/2011 – 03/2014
B.A. in Philosophy and German Studies
FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg
Selected publications
Edited Volumes
Schmidt, S. & Ernst, G. (2020). The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity
New York: Routledge (Routledge Studies in Epistemology series).
Journal Articles
Schmidt, S. (2022). On Believing Indirectly for Practical Reasons, Philosophical Studies 179, 1795-1819.
Schmidt, S. (2022). Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1-17. Online first.
Schmidt, S. (2021). Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence
Erkenntnis, 1-24. Online first.
Schmidt, S. (2020). Rationality and Responsibility
Australasian Philosophical Review 4, 379-385.
Schmidt, S. (2017). Why We Should Promote Irrationality
Grazer Philosophische Studien 94, 605-615.
Schmidt, S. (2016). Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens
Grazer Philosophische Studien 93, 571-582.
