• Epistemology

  • Metaethics

  • Ethics of Belief

Curriculum vitae


Complete CV here.

Selected publications



Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance

ed. N. Pedersen, Brill Studies in Skepticism, a supplement to the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, forthcoming.

The Reasons Responsiveness Account of Doxastic 

Responsibility and the Basing Relation

Erkenntnis,  84:4, 877-893, 2019.

The Consequential Conception of Doxastic ResponsibilityTheoria, 83:1, 4-28, 2017.

The Legitimacy of Intellectual Praise and Blame

The Journal of Philosophical Research, 40, 189-203, 2015.

Epistemic Emotions: a Natural Kind? Epistemic Emotions

Philosophical Inquiries, 2:1, 173-190, 2014.

The Value Problem of Knowledge: an Axiological Diagnosis of the Credit Solution

Res Philosophica, 90:2, 261-275, 2013.


Knowledge Is Extrinsically Apt Belief Virtue Epistemology and the Temporal Objection

J. Greco and Ch. Kelp (eds.), Virtue Epistemology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.


The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought

K. McCain and S. Stapleford, Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles, New York, Routledge University Press, forthcoming.


Passing the Epistemic Buck (with D. Fassio)

C. McHugh, J. Way, D. Whiting (eds.), Metaethical Problems in the Epistemic Domain, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 46-66, 2018.


Virtue-Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New Problem

H. Battaly (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, New York, Routledge, 317-29, 2018.



Qu’est-ce que la justification? Paris, Vrin, 2015.

Foundations of an Ethics of Belief, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2013.