• Epistemology

  • Metaethics

  • Ethics of Belief

Curriculum vitae


Complete CV here.

Selected publications



Meylan, A. (forthcoming). In Defense of the Normative Conception of Ignorance. Erkenntnis.

Meylan, A. (forthcoming). “Doxastic Justification and Creditworthiness”, in: L. Oliveira & P. Silva (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification, New York: Routledge.

Meylan, A. (2021). Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(1), 199-216.

Meylan, A. (2021). Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Pragmatist Stance. In Non-Evidentialist Epistemology (pp. 197-210). Brill.

Meylan, A. (2020). Ignorance and its disvalue. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 97(3), 433-447.

Meylan, A. (2020). The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought. In Epistemic Duties (pp. 208-217). Routledge.

Meylan, A. (2019). The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation. Erkenntnis, 84(4), 877-893.

Meylan, A. (2018). Assessing self-deception: Butler, Clifford, and contemporary philosophy. Revue philosophique de la France et de letranger, 143(3), 357-370.



Qu’est-ce que la justification? Paris, Vrin, 2015.

Foundations of an Ethics of Belief, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2013.