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It is our great pleasure to announce that the director of the ZEGRa research group, Anne Meylan (UZH) and Chris Kelp (University of Glasgow) have just been awarded a four-year FNS grant for the project “Evidence: Knowledge and Understanding” (621’808 CHF). As its title indicates, the project aims to explore a novel and unified account of the way knowledge, understanding and evidence relate to each other (read more about the project here ). The project that should begin in April 2021, will be hiring Miloud Belkoniene as a full-time post-doc researcher for the duration of the project. The project, that will be jointly based at the University of Zurich and the University of Glasgow, will be the first joint project involving both ZEGRa and the Cogito  group, and will hopefully pave the way for future collaborations. The ZEGRa team wholeheartedly congratulates Anne, Chris and Miloud for this success and is very excited to welcome Miloud amongst us!


Recently Published

  • Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). "Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence", Erkenntnis.


  • van Loon, M. (forthcoming). "Implicit bias: a sin of omission?”, in: Philosophical Explorations.

  • Logins, A. (forthcoming). A Theory of Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy series).

  • Logins, A. (forthcoming). "How to Argue with a Pragmatist", in: Inquiry.

  • Meylan, A. (forthcoming). “The Disvalue of Ignorance”, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien

  • Meylan, A. (forthcoming). “Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance”, in: Pedersen, N. (ed.): Brill Studies in Skepticism, a supplement to the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism



  • Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). “Rationality and Responsibility”, in: Australasian Philosophical Review, 5.

  • Logins, A. (2020). “Normative Reasons without (Good) Reasoning”, in: Ethics, 130(2), 208-210.

  • Meylan, A. (2020). “Doxastic Divergence and the Problem of Comparability. Pragmatism Defended Further”, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.1270.


  • Schmidt, S. (2020). “Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind“, in: Schmidt, S. & Ernst, G. (eds.): The Ethics of Belief and Beyond, London: Routledge, 1-20.


  • Schmidt, S. (2020). “Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame”, in: Schmidt, S. & Ernst, G. (eds.): The Ethics of Belief and Beyond, London: Routledge, 149-175.