Welcome to the Homepage of the Zurich Epistemology Group on Rationality (ZEGRa)
ZEGRA is a research group based at the University of Zurich in Switzerland and led by Prof. Dr. Anne Meylan, Assistant Professor of Theoretical Philosophy (Tenure-Track). Our research lies at the intersection of epistemology, metaethics and the philosophy of action and is, thereby, intended to bridge divides between theoretical and practical philosophy. Our research group is mainly — but not exclusively — interested in the following kind of questions: what counts as an irrational belief? What makes cognitive irrationality distinct from agentive irrationality (the one that occasionally characterizes our actions)? Is self-deception always reprehensible? What does it mean to believe things responsibly?
News
Sebastian Schmidt has been awarded the Karl Giehrl prize for his dissertation "The Problem of Mental Responsibility. Outlines of an Ethics of Mind".
The prize is awarded by the faculty of philosophy of the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg and is endowed with 1'500 €.
Glenn Anderau has been awarded the SOPhiA Best Paper Award 2021 for his paper: Defining Fake News. Kriterion Journal of Philosophy. 35(3): 197–215, 2021.
Recently Published
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Meylan, A., Sarzano, M., Schmidt, S., van Loon, M. (forthcoming): Beyond Evidence in Epistemology, Special Issue of Philosophical Topics (with contributions by Lisa Bortolotti, Veli Mitova, Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen, Andrew Reisner, Kate Nolfi, Miriam Schleifer McCormick, and more)
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Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). Responsibility for Rationality. Foundations of an Ethics of Mind, New York: Routledge. (Under contract for Routledge Studies in Epistemology series.)
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Meylan A. (forthcoming). "In Defence of the Normative Conception of Ignorance", Erkenntnis.
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Meylan, A. (forthcoming). “Doxastic Justification and Creditworthiness”, in: L. Oliveira & P. Silva (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification, New York: Routledge.
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Logins, A. (2022). Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy series).
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Schmidt, S. (2022). "On Believing Indirectly for Practical Reasons", Philosophical Studies 179, 1795-1819. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01730-0
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Schmidt, S. (2022). "Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes", Australasian Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2055093
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Anderau, G. (2021). "Defining Fake News", Kriterion 35, 197-215. https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0019
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Gaultier, B. (2021). "When Is Epistemic Dependence Disvaluable?" Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10, 178-187. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.491
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Gaultier, B. (2021). "God and the Girl"; Philosophia, Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 49, 999-1005. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00295-2
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Guilielmo, B. & Mudry, L. (2021). "Suspension du jugement (GP)", France: L’Encyclopédie Philosophique (EP). https://encyclo-philo.fr/item/1695
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Hawthorne, J. & Logins, A. (2021). “Graded Epistemic Justification”, Philosophical Studies 178, 1845-1858, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01512-0.
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Logins, A. (2021). "How to Argue with a Pragmatist", Inquiry, https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1919199
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Logins, A. (2021). "Persistent Burglars and Knocks on Doors: Causal Indispensability of Knowing Vindicated", European Journal of Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12751
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van Loon, M. (2021). "Implicit Bias: a Sin of Omission?”, Philosophical Explorations 24, 325-336. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1923784
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Meylan, A. (2021). "Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(1), 199-216.
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Meylan A (2021). “Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance”, in: N. Pedersen and L. Moretti (eds.), Brill Studies in Skepticism, a supplement to the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3, 197-210
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Mudry, L. (2021). "Two Shapes of Pragmatism", Kriterion 35, 151-165, https://doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0017
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Schmidt, S. (2021). "Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence", Erkenntnis, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00430-9.
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